Abstract -We extend and complete recent work concerning the analytic solution of the minority game. Nash equilibria (NE) of the game have been found to be related to the ground states of a disordered hamiltonian with replica symmetry breaking (RSB), signalling the presence of a large number of them. Here we study the number of NE both analytically and numerically. We then analyze the stability of the recently-obtained replica-symmetric (RS) solution and, in the region where it becomes unstable, derive the solution within one-step RSB approximation. We are finally able to draw a detailed phase diagram of the model.
Introduction
The minority game has drawn much attention recently as a toy model of a market [1, 2, 3] . In the simplest possible case, when no public information [4] is present, its definition is fairly simple. At each time step, N players have to choose between two actions, such as buying a certain stock or selling it. Those who end up in the minority side win. This mechanism can be obtained by abstracting the well known law of supply-and-demand. When the majority of traders is buying a certain asset it is convenient to be a seller, for prices are likely to be high, and viceversa. The minority side has an advantage.
The full complexity of the model arises in the presence of public information, which is modeled by the occurrence of one of P events labeled by an integer µ representing, e.g., some political news or a price change. In the minority game agents resort to choice rules or information-processing devicescalled strategies henceforth -which suggest them whether to "buy" or "sell" given the information they have received. Then each player acts according to the suggestion of his best performing strategy. This mechanism allows to tackle the central problem one faces when trying to understand the collective behaviour of systems of heterogeneous agents interacting under strategic interdependence (as in markets), that is, how agents react to public information (e.g., political news or price changes) and the feedback effects that these reactions have on public information.
Early numerical simulations [2, 5, 6, 7] have shown a remarkably rich behaviour where both cooperativity and crowd effects [7, 8] arise. Much emphasis was initially put on the emergence of a cooperative phase in the stationary state as compared to the reference situation of random agentsi.e., agents who toss a coin to decide which action to take. Agents in the minority game are able to coordinate their actions and reduce the global waste of resources below the level corresponding to that of random agents.
Later work [9, 10, 11, 12] has revealed that the agents' adaptive dynamics minimizes a global function, related to market predictability, and that the system undergoes a phase transition between an asymmetric and a symmetric, unpredictable market, as the ratio α = P/N decreases. A full characterization of the model's behaviour for N → ∞ was derived studying the minima of the global function by the replica method [10, 11, 12] . It was also realized that agents can greatly improve their performance and global efficiency if they account for their impact on the market [4, 10, 11] . In this case they may reach a Nash equilibrium, that is a state where no agent can improve his performance by changing his behavior if others stick to theirs. Also in this case the dynamics minimizes a global function, and hence statistical mechanics again allows one to describe in detail the stationary state. However, for Nash equilibria replica symmetry breaking (RSB) occurs. This makes the replica symmetric calculation of Refs [10, 11] only an approximation.
In this paper we move the first steps towards a complete characterisation of the set of NE of the minority game. Our analysis will be slightly more general, for we shall be able to embody the cooperative state as well. First, we shall briefly derive the replica-symmetric solution and show that it has to breakdown due to entropy arguments. Then we compute the number of Nash equilibria, following Ref. [13] , and show that there are exponentially many (in N). By analogy with the de Almeida-Thouless stability analysis of the SK spin glass model [14, 15] , we find the phase transition line separating the replica symmetric from the RSB phase. Finally we shall break the replica symmetry and study the solution in the one-step RSB approximation (1RSB). Probably the exact solution requires infinitely many steps of RSB, but 1RSB provides an extremely close approximation to numerical results. Our final result will be the complete phase diagram of the model within 1RSB.
2 The model
Basic definitions
The essential ingredients of the minority game are:
• N players, labeled by the index i;
• for each player i a strategy variable s i ∈ {±1}, saying which strategy (+1 or −1) player i is adopting (we thus restrict ourselves to the case where players have two strategies each);
• P different information patterns, labeled by the index µ.
At each time step t all players receive the same information µ, drawn at random with equal probability in {1, . . . , P } [16] . Strategies s i are the label of information processing devices, that suggest an action as a value of a binary variable (like "buy" or "sell") upon receiving information µ:
Two such strategies are assigned to each agent and they are drawn at random and independently for each agent, from the set of all 2 P such functions. In practice, the a µ i,s i play the role of quenched disorder, analogous to the random couplings {J ij } in spin glass models.
It is convenient to make the dependence of a 
Clearly, both ξ µ i and ω µ i take on values in {0, ±1} but they are not independent.
The payoff to player i under information µ is defined as
where s −i = {s j } j =i . It is positive whenever i is in the minority group, whence the name of the game. Moreover, players interact with each other only through a global quantity (namely, A µ ). This feature clarifies the meanfield character of the model. The total loss experienced by players under information µ simply reads
which is always positive.
Dynamics
A snapshot configuration of the system corresponds to a point
in the (pure) strategy space {±1}
N . The game is repeated and at each time step players face the problem of choosing the strategy to follow. By assumption, each player keeps a "score" U i,s (t) for each strategy s = ±1 and updates it as the game proceeds. In the beginning, players set U i,±1 (0) = 0. For t > 0 scores are updated according to the map
where η ∈ R and s i (t) denotes the strategy that player i actually uses at time t. The score U i,s of a strategy s is increased if it has predicted the correct minority action at time t. The term proportional to η, which is similar to a "cavity" term in spin glasses [10] , implies that the really adopted strategy has an additional reward, which is positive for η > 0. For η = 1 and N → ∞, the above dynamics of scores reduces to
which was shown to lead to NE [11] . Following [17] , one assumes that the probability with which player i chooses the strategy to adopt at time t depends on the strategy's score as follows:
where C is a normalization constant and Γ > 0 is the learning rate. With this rule, the most successful strategy is more likely to be chosen. The stationary state of the dynamics will be described in general by a probability distribution over the phase space. This can be expressed in terms of the so-called mixed strategies, which are the probabilities with which agents play strategies ±1. We introduce the soft spins m i (t) ∈ [−1, 1] as
(Here and henceforth · · · stands for the average over the distribution of s i .)
The stationary state is then described by a point
Hence m i are the relevant dynamical variables and the phase space is [−1, 1] N . Without entering into details, which can be found in Ref. [11] , let us review the main steps leading to the analytic solution. First one can show that the asymptotic dynamics is described by a continuum time process, in the limit N → ∞, in the rescaled time τ = t/N. In this continuum time dynamics, one can find a Lyapunov function, i.e. a function of the dynamical variables which is decreasing on all trajectories of the dynamics and which is bounded from below. This function is
where · · · = (1/P ) µ=1,P · · · and Ω µ = i=1,N ω µ i . Analyzing the stationary states of the dynamics is equivalent to minimizing H η . The limiting cases η = 0 and η = 1 correspond to
H 0 is related to the market's predictability (available information). Indeed, if A µ = 0, then one can predict that the action a µ = −sign A µ is more likely to be successful than the other whenever pattern µ arises. On the other hand, H 1 equals the long run total loss experienced by players.
It is easy to see that [10, 11] :
1. H 0 is a positive definite quadratic form. Hence for η = 0 there is a unique stationary state, corresponding to the cooperative state observed in early numerical simulations;
2. for any η > 0 both the global efficiency and the individual payoffs are sensibly improved with respect to the η = 0 case; 3. for η = 1 there is a large number of stationary states, which turn out to be NE of the game. These states have m 2 i = 1, i.e. agents play pure strategies.
3 Replica approach
Replica-symmetric theory
In order to minimize the Lyapunov function H η we can resort to statistical mechanics methods, for
where Z(β) is the canonical partition function associated to H η . Further, since H η contains quenched disordered we need to apply the replica formalism to analyze its ground states. If we let J = {a µ i,s i } denote collectively the disorder variables and E J (· · · ) denote statistical average over J, the "typical" free energy F η (β) can be obtained from the identity
A long but standard computation (see appendices in Refs [11, 12] ) leads to the following expression:
. (13) where I n is the n dimensional unit matrix,q is the overlap matrix with ele-
(a = 1, . . . , n). The quantities r ab and R a appear as Lagrange multipliers associated to q ab and Q a , respectively. Imposing the replica symmetric Ansatz (q ab = q for all a = b, Q a = Q for all a, and similarly for r ab and R a ) one obtains
with
The ground state properties of H η can now be studied by solving the saddle point equations (obtained by setting equal to zero the derivatives of F
We shall see that, in the β → ∞ limit a RSB phase arises. It is natural then to ask whether there is a critical temperature β c separating a high temperature behavior from a low temperature one. This question, even if not directly related to the Minority Game, may be of interest in its own and can be answered at the RS level. Without going into details, let it suffice to mention that setting q = 0 in the RS saddle point equations -which is correct for the high temperature phase -one finds β c = 0 for all values of α and η.
Entropy of the RS solution for η = 1
In random Ising spin systems useful indications about the stability of the RS solution are provided by the zero temperature entropy, namely
This quantity is non-negative, due to the discreteness of the configuration space of the model (for instance, {±1} N ). If its zero temperature limit turns out to be negative, the corresponding solution is unstable and further steps in the approximation are needed.
In our case, this point is more subtle than it seems. In fact, H η is defined for soft spins m i ∈ [−1, +1], and not for Ising variables. The corresponding configuration space is not a discrete set of points, but rather a continuum. Therefore, in principle, the zero temperature entropy need not be non-negative.
For η = 1, however, H η attains its minima on the corners of the phase space 2 [−1, 1] N , i.e. m i = ±1 for all i. Hence the zero temperature entropy 2 This is due to the fact that H 1 is an harmonic function of m i , i.e. ∇ 2 m H 1 = 0. This implies that extrema occurs on the corners (see ref. [11] for more details).
calculation is revealing. Leaving details of the computation aside, the final result is that for α > 1/π
This is negative for all α > 1/π and it diverges at α = 1/π. For α < 1/π one finds S 1 = −∞. This means that RSB occurs for all values of α for η = 1.
The number of Nash equilibria
A second hint of the occurrence of replica symmetry breaking is gained from the study of the number of minima of H 1 . We show here that an exponentially (in N) large number of minima, i.e. Nash equilibria, occurs.
In order to compute the number of Nash equilibria (NE) we use the fact that NE are in pure strategies s i = ±1. Then of course a NE must be such that
Hence an indicator function for NE is (using 2(ξ µ i ) 2 ≃ 1)
(I N E = 1 if {s i } is a NE and = 0 otherwise) and the number of NE is just obtained summing over all configuration {s i } (which we denote by Tr s ). Hence N N E = Tr s I N E {s i }. Following [13] we take the average over the disorder and introduce the integral representation of the θ function. After a long but standard calculation, we arrive at
Eq. (20) is dominated by the saddle point of φ, which is attained at ω = 1−γ, Ω = , where γ is the root of the equation
In terms of the solution γ * of this equation we have
The behavior of φ as a function of α is shown in Fig. 1 . As expected (see [4] ), as α → 0 the number of NE grows as 2 N . Numerical results from exact enumeration for N ≤ 20 are in good agreement, which shows that the annealed approximation used here (i.e., taking the average of N N E ) is sufficient and one does not need to introduce replicas (to compute the average of log N N E ) at this level.
de Almeida-Thouless line
A more thorough analysis can be obtained using the de Almeida-Thouless (AT) protocol [15] . In order to investigate the stability of the RS ground states of H η against RSB we compute the matrix of the second derivatives of the general expression for the free energy, Eq. (13), with respect to q ab and r ab . The conditions for RSB are then obtained by studying the effect of fluctuations in the direction of RSB. This analysis results in an instability line -i.e. a family of points where the RS solution becomes unstable -in the parameter space (α, η), called the AT line. The resulting equation has to be solved (numerically) together with the RS saddle point equations.
Some details of the calculation are reported in the appendix. We have studied particularly the so called replicon mode, i.e. those eigenvectors of the stability matrix which are symmetric under interchange of all but two of the indices. The replicon mode is typically responsible for the onset of the RSB instability. Points on the AT line are found to satisfy the following stability condition:
The "susceptibility" χ ≡ β(Q − q)/α remains finite as β → ∞, so that the zero temperature behaviour can be safely detected. Results are reported in Fig. 2 . For η = 0 replica symmetry is preserved for all α. The point α c = 0.3374 . . . where the second order phase transition occurs in the standard MG, separates a line of first order phase transitions, for α < α c , from a second order line. For η = 0 + one finds RSB for α c = 1 + . Finally, for η = 1, RS is broken for all α.
Replica symmetry breaking
The one step breaking of replica permutation symmetry is expressed by the Parisi Ansatz for the q ab 's and the Q a 's, where an additional parameter denoted by m is introduced: Q a = Q (all a), q ab = q 1 (all a = b such that |a − b| ≤ m) and q ab = q 0 (otherwise). The "free energy" is the same as in Eq. (13), but this time the overlap matrix has to be parameterised aŝ
where ǫ n is the n-dimensional column vector with all components equal to one (so that ǫ n ǫ T n is the n dimensional matrix with all elements equal to one) and we have used the standard tensor product.
We need to consider the matrix
that iŝ
Using the identities
we can decomposeT into tensor products and write its determinant |T | in a straightforward way (we need |T | because Tr(logT ) = log |T |). We get
that is, the first factor in square brackets is an eigenvalue ofT with multiplicity one, the second factor is an eigenvalue with multiplicity n m − 1, while the third one is an eigenvalue with multiplicity n − n m . Putting the latter formula into Eq. (13) and taking the n → 0 limit as requested by the replica trick, we obtain the one step replica symmetry broken free energy F (1RSB) η (β). The final expression is:
where · · · x denotes again the average over the unit gaussian variables x and
(β) depends on seven parameters: Q, q 0 , q 1 , their related Lagrange multipliers R, r 0 and r 1 , and m. Their values have to be determined selfconsistently from the seven saddle point equations obtained by setting to zero the derivatives of the free energy with respect to the above parameters. These equations can be solved numerically.
There are three different regimes in the (α, η) plane when β → ∞:
1. For α < α 0 ≃ 0.09012 . . . we find H η = 0. The solution does not depend on η as long as η > 0. The self-overlap is Q = 1 signalling that agents play pure strategies (m i = ±1) but off diagonal overlaps q 1 > q 0 are both less than 1. This suggests that NE are organized in a complex geometric structure. The parameter m attains a finite value.
2. For α 0 < α < α 1 (η) the solution has H η > 0, it is independent of η (for η > 0) and 1 = Q = q 1 > q 0 . The spin susceptibility χ = β(Q − q 1 )/α attains a finite value in the limit β → ∞, which diverges as α → α 0 . Again agents play pure strategies and q 0 < 1 is the typical overlap between two NE. The parameter m vanishes as 1/β (indeed the βm is finite as β → ∞). The line α 1 (η) is determined by the solution of
3. In between the line α 1 (η) and the stability line α c (η) the solution has H η > 0 and 1 > Q = q 1 > q 0 . Hence agents do not play pure strategies. The solution in this region depends on η. Figure 3 shows that the one-step calculation for σ 2 /N agrees very well with numerical simulations and it represents a considerable improvement over the replica symmetric result 3 Further steps of RSB, most probably infinitely many, are likely to be needed to recover exact results. However, already the one step calculation provides a rather good approximation.
Conclusion
Summarizing, we have analyzed the soluition of the minority game by means of statistical mechanics methods. Our starting point has been the study of Refs [10, 11] , where the NE of the game have been mapped onto the ground states of a disordered hamiltonian with RSB, suggesting the existence of a very large number of them. First, we have computed (both analitically and numerically) the number of NE, showing that actually they are exponentially many in N (number of players). Then, we have probed the stability of the replica symmetric theory developed in Ref. [10] . After showing the necessity of RSB by simple entropy considerations, we have calculated the instability line (AT line) using the de Almeida-Thouless method. Finally, we have derived the broken-replica-symmetry solution, drawing the complete phase diagram of the model. All our results are in excellent agreement with computer experiments.
To our knowledge, the minority game is the first example of a market game whose behavior is so complex to require the full use of spin glass theory for its characterization. Remarkably, many features actually observed in real markets can be recovered within the simple setup of the minority game [3, 4, 5] . Understanding real markets is among the most challenging theoretical problems ahead of us. This work suggests that statistical mechanics of disordered systems may be a valuable tool in this endeavour.
A Calculation of the AT line
The stability matrix has dimension n(n − 1) × n(n − 1) and is given by
where
and
(33) (F denotes shortly the replica-symmetric free energy.) Introducing the "perturbation" of the RS solution in the form δq ab = ζ ab and δr ab = xζ ab (34) with the condition b ζ ab = 0 for all a, it is possible to show that this condition is satisfied for all n by 
